Wednesday, January 20, 2010

The Next Big Coordination Problem

The costs of coordination are falling, rapidly. Our old models for how to organize and leverage the efforts of multiple people across disciplines are being outmoded.

The bureaucratic model has been universally adopted as the standard form for business organization because it has been highly successful. It's a model that has been under development for literally thousands of years. The bureaucratic model emphasizes command and control, and explicitly defines the rewards (payment) for participation. Within a bureaucracy each person has a specific role, and specific pay. The primary benefit of the bureaucratic model is that it manages the (traditionally high) costs of coordination involved in getting hundreds of people to work together on the same problem.

The wiki model, including the open source movement and crowdsourcing, seeks to revolutionize how people organize. The wiki model uses technology to lower the costs of coordination, making it practical to capture value from contributors who don't wish to join a bureaucracy, but do wish to contribute on their own terms. The wiki model lets contributors take on any role they wish. And, the wiki is efficient at capturing value in extremely small increments, one contribution at a time, as opposed to the bureaucratic model which requires the establishment of a formalized, contractual relationship before value can be captured.

A hallmark of the wiki model is a blurring of the distinction between professional and amateur contributors. For example, nearly all Wikipedia contributors are amateurs while Google utilizes both a large professional bureaucracy  and the efforts of users to index the web. Unlike the bureaucratic model, in the wiki world people often contribute their effort for free.

This is a problem.

It's a problem because it means that there will not be enough contribution. Technology and the development of the wiki model have lowered the costs of coordination, but those costs still are far from zero. The most important costs of coordination have always been, and still are, the costs associated with transacting for value. The genius of the wiki model is that it captures the value of amateur (unpaid) contributions. But, it's not going to replace the bureaucratic model until it can also capture professional contribution, and this means getting payment to flow from users to contributors.

The revolution is not going to arrive until professional contribution can be bought and sold at the margin. The death knell of the bureaucratic model will be the development of a system that makes it easy to purchase discrete units of professional contribution, instead of having to hire professionals.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Walking Through Walls





The following is an excerpt from an essay by Eyal Weizman on the unusual tactics used by the Israeli Defense Force during their 2002 invasion of Nablus (quote from Brig. General Aviv Kokhavi). Hat tip to the excellent BLDBLOG.

"This space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion, after all, it must be bound by physics, as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do you interpret the alley? Do you interpret the alley as a place, like every architect and every town planner does, as a place to walk through, or do you interpret the alley as a place forbidden to walk through? This depends only on interpretation. We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through, and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place. And this is what we tried to do.





This is why we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. We were thus moving from the interior of homes to their exterior in a surprising manner and in places we were not expected, arriving from behind and hitting the enemy that awaited us behind a corner. . . . Because it was the first time that this methodology was tested [at such a scale], during the operation itself we were learning how to adjust ourselves to the relevant urban space, and similarly, how to adjust the relevant urban space to our needs. . . . We took this microtactical practice [of moving through walls] and turned it into a method, and thanks to this method, we were able to interpret the whole space differently! . . ."

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Trade Deficit Bad?

As always, please explain to me where I’m getting it wrong.



The common argument, repeatedly endlessly by reporters and politicians, is that if we import more than we export then that’s bad. It’s bad for American workers because they’re going to lose their jobs if we don’t buy what they make. It’s bad for our long term prosperity because we’re sending all of our money to foreign countries. And it’s bad because it means we’re losing! We’re being outcompeted by our economic and military rivals, e.g. China.

It’s a pretty compelling argument, on the face of it. But there’s something confusing about the whole thing, something that doesn’t quite add up.

When I buy a shiny new Japanese-built car my dollars go to the manufacturer in Japan, and I get the car. But the manufacturer can’t use my dollars to buy things in Japan; the law says you can only use yen to buy things in Japan. So the manufacturer who built my new car has to either spend those dollars in the US, or trade them to someone else who wants to spend them in the US. Those dollars are claims against goods and services in the US – they have to come back to the US in order to be spent.

So every time I spend a dollar buying some imported good, that dollar goes to the foreign company that sold me their product. But eventually that same dollar comes back to the US to be spent on something here. It HAS to, there’s no other place for it to go. So how can we even have a trade deficit? Every dollar spent by Americans on imports eventually comes back as spending on domestic goods, services … or investment.



Investment is the thing that balances the trade deficit. Investment doesn’t show up in imports and exports (when I buy stock in a business, the business stays where it is), so it isn’t counted when computing the trade deficit. So, the reason that America has had a trade deficit with the rest of the world for decades is because Americans have been buying imports while the rest of the world has been buying ownership in America.

What does it mean that the rest of the world is buying ownership in America? Primarily it means two things: 1) Foreign investment in American companies, and 2) Foreign investment in US Federal debt. The rest of the world wants to invest in America because America is a good bet. American companies are enormously productive, and the American government doesn’t default on its loans.

Is it a bad thing that foreigners have been buying ownership in American business? No! American businesses use that investment to innovate and grow. Is it a bad thing that foreigners own US Federal debt? No! The US Treasury sells bonds according to policies that it believes are in the best interests of the US financial system and economy.

The primary effects of the trade deficit have been that Americans have enjoyed low prices for goods and services of all kinds, and have benefited from high levels of direct foreign investment. The real risk is that one day the trade deficit will go away as investment shifts from the increasingly regulation-bound US, to freer markets.

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Creeping Anarchy

I think it was my good friend Justin who recently pointed out to me that one Anarchist viewpoint is that societies are largely self-organizing -- and government is a sham. There's something interesting in this argument, though I am not yet ready to accept it in total. It's an empirical statement, and as such it's either right or wrong.



I DO think that our would be overlords are generally helpless to impose unpopular policies, thanks to our democratic institutions. And no matter how you poll it, healthcare reform is hugely unpopular.This recent AP News blurb documents the likely shedding of still more features from the planned healthcare legislation package. Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't that mean there is no meaningful healthcare reform left in either of the bills? Sure there's that thing about how the states should maybe do something about the lack of competition in the market for health insurance, but that doesn't count, especially compared against what was planned but has since gone missing: the public option, a requirement that large companies provide health insurance, regulation of insurance, elimination of the tax break on employer provided plans, meaningful provision of aid for the poor, any means for containing costs, and funding.

I think this all has to do with the fact that,

"...rules are hard to change (because they) reflect the values that are embedded in a culture."

Sound wisdom.

Productivity and Effects on Labor



If productivity increases because of new technology, will demand for labor fall?

I think it's complicated. If the market for a particular product is saturated, (e.g. there is plenty of supply of toasters to meet demand) then an increase in productivity will mean that fewer people will be necessary to maintain the current level of production. Demand for labor to produce that product will fall if productivity increases.

But consider a product that is useful and valuable, but that is too expensive to produce. Because of the high price most people use some substitute product that is cheaper. E.g. mobile phones during the 1980s. New technology that increases productivity for this kind of product will drive an increase in demand for labor to produce the product, as the market for the product grows.

Paul Rako discusses how increases in productivity cause the value of the output of each worker to increase, thereby supporting higher wages. I think he's kind of right, but that the mechanism isn't direct. The price of labor depends less on the value of the output of a particular job title at a particular business, and more on the value of output of labor altogether for the entire economy. To look at it another way ask your self the question: What is the difference between high wages and a low cost of living? If I work in a factory making widgets, and management brings in new machinery that enables me to make more widgets every hour, do I get a raise? Probably not, especially if the new equipment is just as easy to operate as was the old equipment. On the other hand, if my favorite auto manufacturer is making nicer cars for less money today than it was five years ago, that's value that has raised my standard of living even though my productivity may not have changed in five years.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Intuitive Explanation of Who Pays the Tax



Non-intuitive explanation
When a tax is levied against a transaction, both parties to the transaction end up bearing some of the burden of the tax. Whether the buyer or the seller pays more of the tax depends on who has the greater elasticity.


Intuitive explanation
If I want to buy a new boat, but the government just put a new luxury tax on boats, will the boat dealer be able to pass the tax along to me or will he be forced to eat the tax? It depends on who wants to do the deal the most. Of course the seller will do his best to pass the tax on to me, but if he’s desperate to sell boats, and so are his competitors who are also trying to sell me a boat, then he’ll lower his price to get me to buy – effectively eating the tax himself.

It doesn’t matter who officially pays the tax. For example, officially I pay my income tax. But in a tight labor market (when there are lots of jobs and companies are having a hard time finding enough employees), my employer might be the one who is effectively paying the tax. Let’s say that I’m working for a company during a time when employers are desperate to hire people, and the government increases the income tax. My current employer doesn’t automatically raise my salary to compensate me for the increased taxes, so he’s effectively forcing me to eat the tax. However, if another company offers me a position doing the same kind of work for more money, then I can either take the new job, or try to extract a raise out of my current employer. In that kind of market I can effectively force the cost of the tax onto either my old employer or my new employer, because they need me worse than I need them.

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Lost Decade?

I keep hearing reports that the 'naughts' have been a lost decade. Setting aside for a moment that ten years is an arbitrarily chosen length of time, with arbitrarily chosen starting points, I still can't really see a good justification for such a judgement. Have we really made no progress for ten years? Are we really no wealthier?



The blue area is the 'lost decade'. The boom and bust are clearly visible, however, by the measure of this graph we have continued to increase not just our wealth, but the rate of growth of our wealth throughout the past decade (notice how the trend line is bending upwards). But, let's cancel out the effects of population growth just to make sure.



OK, so the rate of growth of wealth on a per capita basis isn't increasing as much a it might have seemed from the previous graph, but wealth per capita is definitely going up. Lost decade? I just don't see it here.

In fairness, my numbers only go through July of 2009, so the graph might dip a bit more at the very end, but I haven't heard any news that the past 6 months have dramatically worse than the year prior, so we should still be in the general vicinity of the trend line.



This last graph shows again that the past ten years don't look remarkably different from any 10 year period since the 1950s. Substantial volatility in the per capita growth rate, but generally positive. Here's the source for my data for all three graphs.

Maybe these are not the right measures, or maybe there's something deceptive about these graphs. If so, please help me to understand why the past ten years have been a lost decade.
 
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